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services was upheld for income tax purposes.' 2 A bona fide gift to
a wife which she invested in a partnership without services on her
part was held not enough to support a partnership.13
Since the decision by the Supreme Court in this case, the Tax
Court has been applying this test: "If... it is found that the partners joined together in good faith to conduct a business, having
agreed that the services or capital to be contributed presently by each
is of such value to the partnership that the contributor should participate in the distribution of profits, that is sufficient." 14 So that
even where capital invested had been withdrawn, the court found a
bona fide intent to continue the partnership.' 5 Minor capital invested
and unessential services rendered by the wife were considered along
with the method of distribution of profit in determining the bona fides
of a family partnership.'6 Even where the wife worked conscientiously and for long hours, and her services were vital, the partnership was not recognized since the court found no bona fide intent on
her part to become a partner.' 7 No formal agreement is necessary,
if there is a bona fide intent to form the partnership.' 8 Where the
wives of the present partners were brought into the partnership to
bolster the credit standing and the wives performed no services and
contributed no capital, the court held that there was a valid partnership because the intent to form the partnership was present. 19
The trend appears to require an intent of the parties to render
present service to, or investment in, the alleged partnership. The
factors of capital and services are part of the yardstick and no longer
the major consideration in accepting or rejecting the partnership for
income tax purposes.
P. H.,

JR.

TORTS-LIABILITY FOR PRENATAL INJURIES.-The personal rep-

resentative of an unborn viable child brought an action for the wrongful death 1 of such child caused by the alleged negligence of defendant
hospital. The complaint stated that while the infant's mother was in
Runyon v. Commissioner, 8 T. C. 350 (1947).
Sandberg v. Commissioner, 8 T. C. 423 (1947).
Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 744, 745 (1949).
'5 Wilson v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. #57 (1949).
'-1 Cobb v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. #66 (1949).
17 Funai v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. #90 (1949).
18 Matuszewski v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. - #96 (1949).
19Delchamps v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 281 (1949).
'MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02. "When death is caused by the wrongful
act or omission of any person or corporation, the personal representative of
the decedent may maintain an action therefor if he might have maintained an
action, had he lived, for an injury caused by the same act of omission."
12
13
14
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defendant hospital giving birth to the infant, she suffered a ruptured
uterus and died of hemorrhages resulting therefrom, that due to
defendant's negligence she died undelivered and that in the exercise
of reasonable care on the part of defendant such infant would have
been born alive. The lower court sustained a demurrer to the complaint holding that a cause of action was not stated. Held, reversed.
A recovery may be had for prenatal injuries caused by the negligent
acts of defendant. Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N. W. 2d 838, - Minn.
-,

38 N. W. 2d 838 (1949).

This was a case of first impression in Minnesota and, therefore,
the court was unfettered by binding precedent. The authorities from
other jurisdictions were reviewed and it was found that the vast
weight of authority refused liability for prenatal injuries. 2
The leadink'case on the subject in the United States is Dietrich v.
Inhabitants of Northhampton3 wherein Holmes, J., stated, "... the
unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury.. ." 4
The court there reasoned that an infant en ventre sa mere is not a
separate person in contemplation of law, not a human being in esse
but rather a part of its mother and, therefore, possesses no right of
immunity from harm, for no duty of care is owed. 5 The lack of
precedent at common law was cited to substantiate this decision 6
while it was also deemed an expedient result in view of the great
difficulty of proof 7 The overwhelming weight of authority, including
2 Dietrich

v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Allaire

v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 I11.
359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900); Drobner v. Peters,
232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921); Buel v. United Ry. of St. Louis, 248
Mo. 126, 154 S. W. 71 (1913); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 99 Atl.
704 (1901); Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. and Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159
N. W. 916 (1916); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex.
347, 78 S. W. 2d 944 (1935); Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60,
274 N. W. 710 (1937); Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28
(1940); Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N. J.L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (1942); Smith v.
Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N. E. Zd 446 (1939) ; Sanford v. St. LouisSan Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926).
3 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
4Ibid., 52 Am. Rep. at 245.
5 It should be noted that in the Dietrich case the court was dealing with
injuries to a non-viable infant. Later cases applied the reasoning of that decision to instances where the injuries were incurred by a viable infant But
see Williams v. The Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., infra note 21, wherein this
extension was bitterly assailed, and Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. and Light
Co., supra note 2, where liability was denied for injuries to a non-viable infant,
but which indicates that a cause of action would be allowed for injuries to
a viable infant.
6 52 Am. Rep. 242, 243 (1884): "... the plaintiff .... can hardly avoid
contending that a pretty large field of litigation has been left unexplored until
the present moment."
7 Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N. J.L. 455, 26 A. 2d 684, 687 (1942) (dissenting opinion) ". . . the real reasons for these holdings, and it is not at all
concealed in some of the opinions, is a rule of convenience. . . . the principles involved in this case should be decided on rules of reason and not of

convenience or lack of authority."
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New York, has followed the reasoning of this court and liability has
been denied. The leading case in New York on the subject, Drobner
v. Peters,8 rejected statements of a contrary nature made by a lower
court in a prior decision. 9 The Court of Appeals while recognizing
the harshness and inequity resulting from a denial of liability, nevertheless, felt constrained to follow the rule established at common law
and refused to judicially legislate the matter.
The Restatement of Torts 10 follows the majority rule and expressly denies a cause of action for injuries or wrongful death effected
by negligent acts committed before birth. But in a caveat added
thereto it is stated that the institute takes no position as to liability
for injuries caused by intentional
or reckless acts committed against
1
the mother or the infant.'

The rule adhered to by the majority of American jurisdictions
has, nevertheless, not been without critics who attack the harshness
and inequity of the doctrine. 12 Why, these critics ask, is an infant
en ventre sa mere regarded as a part of its mother for purposes of
tort liability and yet given the attributes of a separate existence
under the criminal law 1 and the law of property.' 4 It has been said
that the infant is regarded as a separate person in the latter instance
by virtue of a legal fiction ".

.

. as a rule of property for all purposes

beneficial to the infant after his birth but not for purposes working
to his detriment." 15 This naturally prompts the question, is not
the right to immunity from personal harm more sacred than the
right to enjoy property? If the public interest protects unborn infants from intentional injuries,' 6 why should it not also protect
against negligent injuries?
The court in the principal case chose to disregard the overwhelming weight of American authority and, in effect, adopted the
rule of the Civil Law 17 which allows recovery for prenatal injuries.
The court cited with approval statements made in decisions of both
American and foreign jurisdictions, an analysis of which only serves
to indicate the widespread adherence to the majority view by states
Drobner v. Peters, supra note 2.
9 Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N. Y. Supp.
367 (2d Dep't 1913).
10 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 869 (1934).
"1 Why this distinction between negligent and reckless acts?
12 See PROSSER, TORTS 188 (1941) and authors cited therein.
13 N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 80-82, 1050; N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 500-503.
14 Matter of Halthausen, 175 Misc. 1026, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 144 (Surr. Ct.
1941) (an infant en ventre sa mere, begotten prior to the death of the testator,
was deemed to be alive and in being for all purposes of estate law); Cooper v.
8

Heatherton, 65 App. Div. 561, 73 N. Y. Supp. 14 (2d Dep't 1901)

(a testa-

mentary provision relating to a youngest son was held to apply to a child conceived before but born after the father's death).
15 Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 222, 133 N. E. 567, 568 (1921).
16 See notes 11 and 13 supra.
17 Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 Dom. L. R. 337 (Canada 1933).
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following the common law.' 8 The court also cited with approval a
recent federal case, 19 where as here the question was one of first
impression. There the court in a forceful opinion criticized the
majority rule and found liability for prenatal injuries. It is interesting to note that only one month prior to the decision of the principal
case, the Supreme Court of Ohio,20 also deciding the question for
the first time, held that the infant had a cause of action for injuries
incurred prior to birth.21 The two later cases, therefore, taken in
conjunction with the principal case show an increasing dissatisfaction
with the harsh majority rule.2 2 To the contention that there exists
no precedent, it is answered that the law is not ". . . an arid and
sterile thing, and is anything but static and inert." 23 To the argument that there is a great difficulty of proof and possibility of fraud
it is answered, "The law is presumed to keep pace with the sciences
and medical science certainly has made progress since 1884." 24
It is respectfully submitted that the reasoning advanced by the
principal case is more in keeping with logical consistency and abstract justice. "Why a part of the mother under the law of negligence and a separate entity and person in that of property and
crime ?" 25 It thus seems absurd that the law will protect the infant's
property interests through a legal fiction and yet offer no protection
for its outstanding and most important interest, immunity from bodily
harm. It offends reasoning and conscience to deny liability if the
injury occurs one minute before birth and to allow liability if the
injury occurs one minute after birth. The effects of injuries in the

18 Stemmer v. Kline, 19 N. J. Misc. 15, 17 A. 2d 58 (1942), rev'd, 128
N. J. L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489, 684 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942). Kline v. Zuckerman,
4 Pa. Dist. & Go. R. 227 (1924). Contra: Berlin v. J. C. Penney, supra note
2; Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. and Light Co., supra note 5 (the court by
obiter dicta stated that a recovery might be allowed if the infant were viable
at the time of the injury) ; Cooper v. Blank, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. 1923) ; Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, supra note 17. In the latter two cases the courts
recognized the rule adhered to by states following the common law but adopted
the contrary rule in keeping with their Civil Law backgrounds.
19 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D. C. 1946).
20 Williams v. The Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N. E.
2d 334 (1949).
21 An unborn viable child is a person within the meaning of the State Constitution which entitles ". . . every person, for an injury done his person to
a remedy by due course of law." OHIO CoNsT. Art. I, § 16.
22 It should be noted, however, that the principal case went further than
any case found wherein recovery was allowed. In all such cases the child
proved its capacity to survive by actually surviving apart from its mother, even
if for only a short time. Here the infant died in its mother's womb, not having
lived separate and apart from her for even the shortest period.
23 Bonbrest v. Kotz, supra note 19 at 142.
24 Ibid. In reference to the date of the Dietrich case, supra note 3.
25 Ibid.
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latter case are26just as patently burdensome and oppressive as those
of the former.
Despite these moving considerations it is felt that the law of
New York is too well settled to be changed except by legislation.
California is the only state found wherein such a statute has been
enacted. The highest court of that state has construed 27 the statute -'
as changing the common law rule and allowed a recovery for prenatal
injuries. There the case hinged on the interpretation of the word
interests, as found in the statute. The court held that the right to
immunity from harm was one of the interests protected.
A. T. L.

WILLS-MULTIPLE EXECUTION-PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION"

-BURDEN

OF

PRooF.-Respondents objected to the issuance of let-

ters of administration, alleging that the decedent left a will. To
succeed they must produce the will of the decedent.' Respondents
propounded two copies of a will executed by the decedent in triplicate
and offered no explanation concerning the third copy which the decedent possessed prior to his death. Held, issuance of letters of
administration granted. Where the will is executed in multiple, all
copies must be produced or their absence accounted for or a presumption will arise that the decedent destroyed the will animo revocandi
particularly when the instrument was in the decedent's possession
prior to his death. In re Rinder's Estate, 196 Misc. 657, 92 N. Y. S.
2d 320 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
Each executed copy of the will constitutes a part of the whole 2
and a destruction animo revocandi of a part revokes the whole will.'
Such a presumption arises when a will or any part thereof was possessed by the decedent and a diligent search of the decedent's effects
26

Stemmer v. Kline, supra note 3, wherein the mother's pregnancy was

diagnosed as a tumor and she was treated with X-rays.
dumb, blind and paralyzed. No recovery allowed.
27 Scott
28 CAT-

Child born deaf,

v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678 (1939).

Civ. CODE § 29: "A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be
deemed an existing person so far as may be necessary for its interests in the
event of subsequent birth."
1 N. Y. SURR. CT. AcT § 144.
2 Crossman v. Crossman, 95 N. Y. 145 (1884).
One copy is probated as
the entire will and the other admitted as evidence, unless each has different
provisions in which case both will be admitted to probate. Matter of Froman's
Will, 54 Barb. 274 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1869). The codicil and will are considered
one for the purpose of construction, but when the codicil is destroyed the will
may stand if enough of it a-as unrevoked by the codicil to allow it to stand
alone. Osborn v. Rochester Trust and Safe Deposit Box Company, 152 App.
Div. 235, 136 N. Y. Supp. 859 (4th Dep't 1912).
3 Matter of Kennedy, 167 N. Y. 163, 60 N. E. 442 (1901); Crossman
v. Crossman, 95 N. Y. 145 (1884).

